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Prointegrative  housing subsidies--low-interest  loans made to 
homebuyers on the basis of race in order to promote and maintain racial 
integration--are  a new and controversial development in open-housing  policy. 
Typically,  black homebuyers receive subsidies to buy in  predominately white 
areas,  while white homebuyers receive subsidies to buy in predominately black 
or integrated areas.  Programs now exist in the Detroit,  Chicago, 
Philadelphia, and Cleveland metropolitan areas,  where funds are provided both 
by private foundations and local governments.  The impact of these programs on 
housing markets has received little attention in the economics or urban 
studies literature,  however.  1 
Race-based subsidies can affect a local housing market through 
several channels.  First,  those who qualify for a subsidy can outbid other 
would-be  purchasers,  placing upward pressure on  housing values.  Therefore, 
controlling for house quality, one would expect subsidized transactions to 
command higher prices.  Second,  subsidies can  be a useful marketing tool for 
attracting potential buyers to an area,  possibly increasing demand and raisin$ 
prices. 
1  Galster (1990) examined the impact of affirmative marketing strategies on 
racial change in Cleveland Heights and Shaker Heights,  Ohio,  between 1970 and 
1980.  He found that these programs resulted in greater integration of 
initially all-white  areas and less racial change in substantially integrated 
areas.  He found no evidence that the programs increased white demand in 
integrated areas.  However,  the period he examined predated the prointegrative 
loan program. 
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impact on expectations of future racial composition.  As discussed in Chambers 
(1988) and Galster (1990),  the dynamics of racial change in many metropolitan 
areas involve the evaporation  of white demand--known  as white flight-- 
following a neighborhood's initial integration,  leading to subsequent 
resegregation.  Popular wisdom holds that this process of resegregation is 
accompanied by reduced housing prices and deteriorating public services.  2 
Empirical evidence suggests that,  controlling for house quality,  housing 
prices are lower in  neighborhoods undergoing rapid transition from all white 
to all black.  When a community initiates or continues to support a 
raced-based  subsidy program, this can signal a firm commitment to maintaining 
integration.  To the extent that such a program reduces the risk of 
resegregation and the potential financial loss to homeowners, its initiation 
can  have a significant  positive effect on  housing prices and white demand. 
This paper examines the impact of the most extensive race-based 
subsidy program administered by a local government: the Fund for the Future of 
Shaker Heights (FFSH).  The City of Shaker Heights, Ohio (in suburban 
Cleveland),  initiated the FFSH in  May 1986,  making it the longest-running 
program of its kind in the country.  In  1989,  the FFSH received the Ford 
Foundation's annual award for "innovations in state and local government." 
Open-housing  activists consider the program a model for other communities that 
wish to promote and maintain racial integration. 
************ 
2  See the discussion of racial change in  Husock (1989). 
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integrated neighborhoods of the suburb and blacks who buy in the predominately 
white areas.  Because of the distribution of race and housing stock in Shaker 
Heights (the predominately white neighborhoods consist of luxury homes,  while 
the integrated neighborhoods consist of relatively modest homes),  the program 
has effectively been directed toward maintaining white demand.  This is 
particularly true in the neighborhood known as Lomond,  where a significant 
number of home purchases include subsidies (a large majority of loans made by 
the FFSH have facilitated purchases there). 
To examine the effect of the FFSH loan program on the Lomond area, I 
first obtained data for all single-family  home purchases in Shaker Heights and 
in a control group of surrounding communities for the years 1983 through 1989. 
These data were then merged with detailed information on the racial 
composition of neighborhoods at the census-tract  level and on house quality 
for each transaction.  Given the panel nature of the data,  I  was able to 
control for fixed neighborhood characteristics.  I  also obtained transaction- 
level data on the race of buyers and sellers for sales within the Lomond 
neighborhood. 
The empirical analysis presented here has two parts.  First, I  estimate 
the direct impact of the FFSH subsidies on racial composition within Lomond 
with a logit model of the probability that a house transaction will involve a 
white seller or buyer.  Second,  I  measure the financial effects of the program 
through a simple hedonic price equation that explains transaction prices as a 
function of house quality,  neighborhood racial composition,  and fixed 
neighborhood effects. (The limitations of hedonic price estimation are 
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Lomond housing market, a measure of loan eligibility is entered into the price 
equation in order to ascertain whether the market intervention systematically 
changed the transaction prices.  I  use variation in loan eligibility amounts 
over time and across streets to distinguish the impact of the loan program 
from general appreciation in the area. 
Results suggest that the FFSH subsidies have contributed to racial 
stability,  and that initiation of the program coincided with appreciation of 
housing prices in the Lomond area.  Subsidies have had the most impact on 
integrated streets where the nonwhite racial composition is between 30 and 70 
percent.  Since the FFSH was established in 1986,  the probability that whites 
will buy houses on a street within this range has risen approximately 20 
percentage points,  while house prices,  which had lagged behind those of 
comparable communities,  have appreciated 5.8 percent per year.  These 
estimates cannot identify,  however, significant appreciation due to variation 
in loan amounts over time, suggesting that the fixed signaling effect of the 
program dominates the financial effects of the relatively small subsidies. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 discusses previous 
research on race and housing and reviews the initial efforts at integration 
maintenance.  Section 2 examines the history of the Shaker Heights loan 
program and the racial change and housing prices in Lomond.  Section 3 reviews 
the data sources used for estimation and discusses the econometric 
specifications employed.  Section 4  presents the logit estimates on racial 
change,  and section 5 presents the hedonic price estimates.  Section 6 
concludes. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm1. Previous Race and Housing Studies 
Research dealing with the impact of racial composition and racial 
change on  housing markets typically measures whether black households pay 
different housing prices than white households, with most studies measuring 
racial price differentials in terms of differences across areas of varying 
racial composition.  Mieszkowski's  (1979) review and an  update by Chambers 
(1988) suggest that analyses using 1950s and 1960s data tend to show higher 
housing prices in  black areas,  while those employing more recent data are more 
likely to report lower prices in  predominately black or changing 
neighborhoods. 
Studies using 1960s data for single metropolitan areas show that 
blacks paid more for equivalent housing in  black and integrated neighborhoods 
(see King and Mieszkowski [1973],  Yinger [1978],  and Schafer [1979]).  Follain 
and Malpezzi (1980),  however, use the Annual Housing Surveys of 1974-76  to 
measure Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)-wide price differentials 
for 39 SMSAs and find discounts for black owners in 34.  Schnare and Struyk 
(1977) report that for Boston and Pittsburgh,  premiums in  black areas 
decreased substantially between 1960 and 1970. 
Studies such as the one by Follain and Malpezzi suffer from their 
inability to measure the racial composition  of neighborhoods and other 
neighborhood characteristics  accurately.  Chambers (1988) shows that 
controlling for fixed neighborhood attributes reduced the estimated price 
discount for blacks from 20 percent to 7 percent in Chicago.  Results reported 
here are based on unusually detailed annual information on race at the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcensus-tract  level (or, in some cases, even at the street level).  The panel 
nature of the data allows for the control of fixed neighborhood effects as 
well. 
Determinants of Racial Change 
A standard explanation for the disappearance of the price premium in 
black neighborhoods is that white suburbanization  has increased the supply of 
housing available to blacks,  relieving the demand pressure that had built up 
in many black areas in the 1950s and 1960s (especially in  northern and 
midwestern cities).  However, the dynamics of suburbanization  can also 
involve the reduction of white demand in those neighborhoods first opened to 
blacks in the 1970s. 
Over time,  of course, the proportion of nonwhite residents in a given 
neighborhood depends on the racial composition of the out-movers  and 
in-movers. The empirical literature has centered on the relative importance 
of the various components of  white/nonwhite  in-  and out-migration.  (See 
Galster [I9901 for  a recent review.) 
Evidence on out-migration  is mixed.  Early studies,  including Mayer 
(1960) and Damerall (1968),  find that the probability of white out-migration 
increases with nonwhite in-migration. Opinion poll data also show that whites 
become "uncomfortable"  and are more likely to move as the proportion of 
nonwhites increases.  Other studies,  however, suggest that white mobility is 
************ 
3  This section draws in part on Chambers (1988). 
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1960s,  white out-migration  rates from integrated tracts were significantly 
higher than from all-white  areas,  but only for those neighborhoods that would 
have been expected to have low mobility.  The differential disappears when 
tracts with higher predicted mobility are compared. 
The impact of racial composition on in-migration  is more obvious. 
Opinion polls have consistently shown that most whites prefer to live in 
predominantly white neighborhoods,  while most blacks and Hispanics favor areas 
with balanced proportions of whites and nonwhites.  Galster (1982) supports 
these findings in an econometric study of the impact of racial composition on 
bids by whites and nonwhites for comparable housing.  Other studies of actual 
mobility show that,  all else equal,  whites are less likely to choose 
neighborhoods with higher percentages of nonwhite residents (see Wilson 
[1983]). 
Housing activists have charged that racial change is also spurred by 
unethical and illegal real estate practices.  Blockbusting,  panic peddling, 
and steering have resulted in whites fleeing neighborhoods undergoing racial 
change.  Although declared unlawful, flagrantly racist practices in real 
estate sales,  financing,  renting,  and appraising are alleged to persist 
because of weak enforcement of fair-housing  laws.  Even normal real estate 
practices, such as door-to-door  or telephone solicitation for listings and 
intensive use of "for sale" signs, can  be indistinguishable from racially 
4  See Wolf and Lebeaux (1969),  Guest and Zuiches (1971),  and other papers 
cited in Galster (1990). 
5  See Farley et al. (1978) and Schuman,  Steeh,  and Bobo (1985). 
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whites to sell.  6 
Empirical evidence thus suggests that the reduction of white demand in 
integrated and racially changing neighborhoods is an important element of the 
dynamics of racial change.  These dynamics--possibly  spurred by real estate 
practices--can  result in the rapid resegregation of neighborhoods.  The 
experience in many communities has been that "integration is no more than the 
brief span of time between the arrival of the first black and the departure of 
the last white.  "7 Chicago suburbs such as Dixmoor,  East Chicago Heights, 
Markham, Maywood, Phoenix, and Robbins and Cleveland suburbs such as East 
Cleveland and Warrensville Heights have been unable to maintain racially mixed 
housing patterns and school enrollment.  Other suburbs such as Blue Island, 
North Chicago, Chicago Heights, or Hammon in the Chicago area and Garfield 
Heights in the Cleveland area have remained integrated,  but have black and 
white households concentrated in separate  neighborhood^.^  The reduction in 
white demand for homes in integrated and racially changing areas is consistent 
with the presence of lower housing prices in those areas. 
************ 
6  Lind (1982) describes several court cases involving such practices. 
7  Alfred and Marcoux (1970). 
8  See Lind (1982). 
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Community groups and local governments have engaged in a wide range of 
activities to counteract the dynamics of racial change that eventually lead to 
resegregation. 
Illegal real estate practices are monitored through fair-housing 
"audits"  by persons (testers) who pose as would-be  homebuyers and then report 
any unethical or illegal treatment.  In addition, activists poll recent 
homebuyers about their experience in the marketplace.  Studies of real estate 
advertising in newspapers have also documented racial discrimination.  When 
illegal real estate practices are uncovered, litigation is often the next 
step. 
Some municipalities also regulate legal but unfavorable real estate 
practices through legislation.  In particular,  direct solicitation for sales 
listings and the posting of "for sale" signs,  practices closely associated 
with blockbusting,  have been targeted.  Other cities--including  Shaker Heights 
and Cleveland Heights--ban  all signs from front yards or residential property. 
Bellwood, Illinois,  requires real estate firms to secure a permit in order to 
solicit door to door,  by mail, or over the telephone.  A Cleveland Heights 
ordinance establishes a means by which homeowners can inform realtors that 
they do not wish to be approached. 
Rather than adopting restrictive and mandatory sign and solicitation 
bans,  many municipalities have established housing and community development 
offices to implement affirmative action strategies.  Most of these strategies 
************ 
9  See Yinger (1986). 
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potential white homebuyers,  is used to project a favorable image of the 
community.  Housing information services may also be provided.  Shaker Heights 
and Cleveland Heights; Oak Park, Illinois;  Southfield,  Michigan; and 
University City,  Missouri,  are among those cities furnishing substantial 
information for individual buyers and renters.  In some cases,  such housing 
services urge potential residents to consider neighborhoods where their 
presence would not contribute to segregation.  Sometimes,  however, these 
services are denied to whites considering predominantly white areas or to 
blacks considering integrated or predominantly black areas.  Several 
communities sponsor educational programs for realtors and provide incentives 
for them to cooperate with affirmative marketing strategies. 
Finally, an offshoot of affirmative marketing plans is the use of 
financial incentives to maintain racial integration,  most often taking the 
form of low-interest  loans.  Community groups and fair-housing  and religious 
organizations were the first to try such an approach.  In an effort to attract 
white homebuyers,  neighborhood groups in Shaker Heights made loans on a small 
scale beginning in 1960.  The Fund for an Open Society, in Philadelphia,  was 
established in 1978 to subsidize the movement of blacks into predominately 
white suburbs.  Jewish residents in Cleveland Heights and Southfield, 
Michigan, established funds to promote the in-migration  of young Jewish 
families, thereby protecting their own substantial investments in local 
cultural and religious institutions.  The first fund explicitly supported by a 
local government rather than by private interests was the FFSH,  to which we 
now turn. 
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The intervention of Shaker Heights community groups and government 
into real estate markets in order to promote stable racial integration dates 
back to 1957.  Like other heavily industrial Great Lakes cities,  Cleveland 
experienced major black in-migration  during and immediately after World War 
11.  By 1960,  the city was 28.6 percent black,  with black neighborhoods 
expanding out of the traditional ghetto located east of the Cuyahoga River, 
which serves as a significant dividing line between the east and west sides. 
Because black in-migration  coincided with significant white flight from the 
city proper, Cleveland was 43.8 percent black by 1980,  while most of the 
city's eastern neighborhoods (including those abutting Shaker Heights) were 
more than 90  percent black. 
Seeking to escape crime and deteriorating local public services, 
blacks also moved into the adjoining inner-ring  communities,  especially after 
the 1967 riots.  Certain suburbs,  including East Cleveland and Warrensville 
Heights,  changed from predominately white to predominately black within a 
decade.  Shaker Heights,  however,  has been able to maintain a relatively 
stable racial composition for more than 30  years.  From 13 percent in 1968, 
the current nonwhite population now stands at 29 percent. 
Shaker Heights was developed in the 1920s by the Van Sweringen 
brothers, who envisioned it as a model community designed around a rapid 
transit line that would provide easy access to downtown Cleveland.  The city 
included housing for a wide range of income groups,  with distinct 
neighborhoods designed to provide intra-community  mobility (see figure 1). 
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neighborhoods of Ludlow,  Lomond,  and Moreland,  which abut Cleveland,  while 
mansions were developed in the northern part of the city.  As shown in table 
1,  housing prices in Lomond are more comparable to those in the rest of the 
eastern Cuyahoga County communities than to prices in the northern section of 
Shaker Heights. 
Before the courts struck down restrictive housing covenants in 1948, 
blacks were banned from purchasing homes in Shaker Heights, as were Jews and 
Catholics.  When a black dentist moved into Ludlow in 1955,  white residents 
feared that the rapid racial change taking place in adjacent Cleveland 
neighborhoods would also occur in their own community.  Responding to the 
proliferation of "for sale" signs,  residents formed the Ludlow Community 
Association in 1957 to counteract adverse real estate practices and to 
encourage whites to buy homes in the area.  These actions were the first of 
their kind and received national attention.  lo  In  1961,  the association began 
to make short-term  loans to prospective white buyers. 
Residents of Lomond responded similarly to integration.  In  1963,  a 
community association  was formed to promote the neighborhood,  prospect for 
white buyers,  and make a limited number of loans to whites interested in 
purchasing homes on blocks with heavy concentrations of blacks.  In  1967, the 
Shaker Heights Housing Office was established with the financial support and 
************ 
10  See "Ludlow: A Lesson in Integration,  " Reader's Digest,  1965. 
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organization took over many of the marketing and prospecting activities 
heretofore conducted  by the community groups. 
The success of these early efforts to maintain racial integration in 
Shaker Heights was mixed.  Moreland,  historically the most blue-collar 
neighborhood,  became predominately black by 1980.  Ludlow,  on the other hand, 
has remained stable since the late 1960s (averaging about 50  percent black). 
Lomond claimed the greatest success in attracting white homebuyers, with sales 
to whites rising from 49 percent in 1966 to 68  percent in 1969.11 
In  the mid-1980s,  however,  Lomond was perceived as becoming 
predominately nonwhite,  particularly in the southwestern  areas adjoining the 
Moreland neighborhood and Cleveland.  Racial data collected by the Shaker 
Heights Housing Office--which  monitors racial occupancy at the house level-- 
confirmed this trend.  In  just four years (1982-86), the percentage of 
nonwhite residents in the western half of Lomond shifted from 40 percent to 65 
percent,  while in the eastern half of the neighborhood that measure grew from 
29 percent to 34  percent.  As shown in table 2,  housing sales to whites 
declined from 81  percent of sales in 1981 to 47  percent in 1985.  Housing 
prices,  which appreciated 14  percent between 1980 and 1985 in the rest of the 
eastside communities,  were flat in Lomond. 
The Shaker Heights Housing Office,  concerned about maintaining the 
long-term  integration of the southern Shaker neighborhoods, launched the FFSH 
in 1986.  Under the program,  white homebuyers in the integrated neighborhoods 
************ 
11  See Alfred and Marcoux (1970). 
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homebuyers are eligible for similar loans if they buy in the suburb's 
predominately white areas.  Because the predominately white neighborhoods 
consist of luxury homes while the integrated neighborhoods consist of 
relatively modest homes, the program has effectively been directed toward 
maintaining white demand,  particularly in Lomond.  Of the 75 loans made by 
1990,  only four went to blacks.  Of the remaining 71 loans, 66 were applied to 
home purchases in Lomond.  City officials defend this imbalance by noting that 
they support a regional program (the East Suburban Council for Open 
Communities,  formed in 1983) that extends loans to black homeseekers in six 
formerly all-white  communities east of the inner-ring  suburbs. 
FFSH directors have varied the loan amounts for which purchasers are 
eligible over time and over specific sections of Lomond.  As shown in figure 
2,  loan amounts were initially set at $3,000  for the entire neighborhood. In 
January 1987,  this figure was increased to $4,000  for houses in the western 
section.  The figure for western Lomond was increased again in April 1990,  to 
$5,000,  but the boundary was shifted west.  I  use this variation in loan 
amounts over time and across sections of Lomond in an effort to distinguish 
the financial impact of the loan amounts from the fixed effects resulting from 
establishment of the program. 
3. Data and Estimation 
The econometric analysis presented here attempts to identify 
three separate potential effects of the FFSH loan program: 1) the direct 
effect on racial composition,  2)  the fixed impact of the initiation of the 
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over time  . 
The first effect--the  impact of the FFSH on racial composition and 
the impact of racial composition on housing prices--ties  this work to other 
studies of race and housing.  I also look for evidence that the racial  . 
discount (premium) for housing prices within Lomond differs from that of the 
surrounding communities.  The second effect measures whether the mere 
existence of a subsidy program--with  its accompanying potential impact on 
expectations of future racial composition--has  an influence on house prices. 
The third effect measures the importance of the subsidy level itself on 
housing values.  The present value of the subsidies is small.  The $5,000  loan 
has a value of $800 to $1,200,  depending on the discount rate used.12 
Nonetheless, for liquidity-constrained  homebuyers,  particularly first-time 
purchasers, the loan can provide an important financial incentive. 
In  practice, disentangling the fixed effect of the program from the 
subsidy effect is difficult.  I rely on the variation in loan amounts over 
time and across streets to identify the latter. (I also identify transactions 
that use the subsidy.)  To examine the fixed effect of the program, I compare 
appreciation in Lomond to that in the surrounding communities to ascertain 
whether a shift in prices coincided with the initiation of the program. 
************ 
12  Discount rates of 10  percent to 18 percent were used. 
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Hedonic models focus on markets in which a generic commodity can 
embody varying amounts of a vector of attributes.  In empirical implementation 
of these models, one major focus is to estimate how the price of one unit of 
the commodity varies with the set of attributes it possesses.  Another focus 
of study is to estimate demand and supply functions for attributes of the 
product. 
However,  as Epple (1987),  Follain and Jimenez (1985),  and others 
point out,  some seemingly natural specifications of the stochastic structure 
of hedonic models prove to be incompatible with their equilibrium 
conditions.13  Epple shows that careful specification of the sources of 
error and orthogonality conditions permits identification and estimation of a 
hedonic model, but the requisite orthogonality conditions prove to be 
relatively strong.  To be satisfied in practice, they require an exhaustive 
set of product, demander,  and supplier characteristics.  The problems are 
particularly acute for estimation of demand and supply equation parameters. 
In  hedonic applications,  however,  the price equation is typically 
estimated by ordinary least squares,  with the supply of attributes and tastes 
of consumers assumed exogenous.  These estimates are consistent if 1)  price 
13  The literature on applying hedonic price models to housing markets is 
lengthy. Rosen (1974) first proposed an estimation procedure to surmount the 
problem posed by the absence of observable prices for attributes.  His 
suggestion sparked a number of applications,  including Murray (1978), Witte, 
Sumka,  and Erekson (1979), Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978), Linneman (1980), 
Ellickson (1981),  and Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981).  Criticism of these 
applications appears in Brown and Rosen (1982),  Epple (1987), Bartik (1987), 
Diamond and Smith (1985), and Follain and Jimenez (1985).  Alternative 
estimation strategies are discussed in Kanemoto (1988), Kanemoto and Nakamura 
(1986),  and Quigley (1982). 
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characteristics are omitted, and 3)  the error term in the price equation is 
uncorrelated with the error vector in the demand equations.  Due to data 
limitations,  I  do not attempt to estimate the parameters of the demand 
equations,  but instead focus on estimating the hedonic price equation under 
the above assumptions.  The high-quality  price and racial composition data, 
extensive set of house characteristics,  and ability to control for fixed 
neighborhood effects reduce the probability of bias due to measurement error 
or omitted variables.  Moreover, this approach allows my results to be 
compared with those of previous studies of race and housing. 
With respect to estimating the impact of the loan program on racial 
composition,  data limitations again prohibit estimating a full structural 
model of whiteblack demand and housing supply.  Therefore,  I  use a logit 
model and estimate two reduced-form  equations of the probability that a house 
will be sold (purchased) by a white.  The independent  variables are assumed to 
capture the implicit structural relationships of both white and black selling 
and buying propensities.  This approach follows Galster (1990), who used 
reduced-form  equations to model racial change at the census-tract  level.  The 
results,  however, should be interpreted cautiously as an econometric 
characterization of a housing market,  not as estimates of housing demand. 
Data 
I  obtained data on all single-family  home purchases in Shaker Heights 
and in a control group of surrounding communities for the years 1983 through 
1989.  I  then merged this information  with detailed data on  house quality 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmacquired from property tax records.  The data were generously provided by 
Thomas Bier of Cleveland State University,  who has done extensive research on 
housing in Cleveland and whose staff at the school's Urban Studies Center has 
invested heavily in cleaning up the information and checking for accuracy. 
The 87 quality variables listed in table 3 are unusually detailed for a 
housing study of this nature.  In addition to standard measures of lot size 
and living area,  this study includes ten measures of exterior wall 
construction,  six measures of housing style, eight measures of construction 
quality,  five measures of roof style,  and six measures of roofing material. 
I also obtained estimates on the racial composition of neighborhoods 
at the census-tract  level.  The Cuyahoga Plan,  a local fair-housing 
organization,  publishes yearly estimates of racial change in Cleveland and its 
environs based on births and deaths at area hospitals.  I applied their 
estimated rates of change to the 1980 census figures for nonwhite residency in 
order to obtain annual estimates of racial composition for each census tract. 
Within the Lomond neighborhood (which spans parts of three census tracts), 
street-by-street  estimates of racial composition  were obtained using data 
compiled by the Shaker Heights Housing Office on the race of each homeowner, 
as well as on buyers and sellers. 
4. Effect of the FFSH on Racial Com~osition 
Since its initiation in May 1986,  the FFSH has made approximately 20 
loans per year,  principally for purchases in Lomond.  Simple statistics 
support the position that the loan program has stabilized racial composition 
there.  As shown in table 2,  sales to whites,  which bottomed out at 47  percent 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmin 1985, rose to 70 percent in 1988 and stood at 59 percent in 1989.  Racial 
composition in the eastern and northern sections of Lomond has stabilized at 
34.9 percent and 36 percent nonwhite, respectively, since 1986.  Western 
Lomond has continued to increase in nonwhite racial composition,  but at a 
slower pace, shifting only four percentage points between 1986 and 1989 
(compared to a 20 percent shift in the previous three years). 14 
To examine the effect of the FFSH on racial composition  more 
systematically,  I use a logit probability model to explain the likelihood that 
house transactions within Lomond will involve  1)  a white seller and  2) a 
white buyer.15  The basic form of the model is shown in equation (1). 
where 
Pi -  the probability that a seller (buyer) is white, 
NONWHITE%it = percent nonwhite population on a particular street in year t, 
QUALITYi - a vector of house-quality  variables for house i, 
14  Street-by-street  data on racial composition are available from the author 
upon request  . 
15  For a discussion of the logit model, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmLOMONDYRt = a trend variable equal to zero in 1980,  ..., equal to nine in 1989, 
i - 1,  ...,  317 single-family  house transactions in Lomond, and 
t = 1980,  ....,  1989. 
I estimate equation (1) for sales (and buys) using maximum-likelihood 
nonlinear estimation with the SAS LOGIST procedure for 317 sales in Lomond 
between 1980 and 1989.16  The sample is limited to single-family  sales for 
which the race of both the buyer and the seller was known  by the Shaker 
Heights Housing Office.  Various forms of the specification are estimated, 
including entering NONWHITE% as a continuous variable, entering NONWHITE% and 
NONWHITE% squared,  and breaking NONWHITE% into a set of dummy variables for 
different categories of NONWHITE%.  In the latter specification,  I create a 
set of dummy variables (NONWHITE%lO-20,  NONWHITE%20-30,  ......, 
NONWHITE%80-90) that equal one if the percentage of nonwhites on the street is 
between 10 and 20 percent, 20 and 30 percent,  ...., 80  and 90  percent, 
respectively.  I report these results because they allow for a more flexible 
model than does just including NONWHITE% linearly.  The qualitative nature of 
the results is the same for all specifications. 
************ 
16  See Harrell (1980). 
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(shown in table 3)  included.  With a few exceptions, such as ATTACHED GARAGE 
and AIRCONDITION, these variables are statistically insignificant.  A joint 
test of the variables rejects the hypothesis that they have explanatory power 
for white sales and white buys.  This is not surprising.  The Lomond housing 
stock was built by one developer,  so housing characteristics, lot size,  and 
construction  quality are homogeneous throughout the neighborhood.  Although 
depreciation  may vary with race (income),  Shaker Heights has a stringent 
point-of-sale  inspection that insures adequate maintenance.  What does vary 
across the neighborhood is racial composition.  When the QUALITYi variables 
are included, the estimated coefficients for the NONWHITES variables are 
little changed.  Their statistical significance,  however, declines from the 99 
percent confidence level to the 90  percent confidence level.  For reasons of 
space,  I report the regression results that exclude the QUALITYi measures, 
although the qualitative nature of the findings remains the same. 
Model 1 includes a dependent variable,  WHITESELL, that equals one if 
a  housing transaction involves a white seller.  This was the case in 242 of 
the 317 sales in Lomond observed over the 1980-89  period.  The results are 
reported in column 1 of table 4.  The coefficients for NONWHITE%lO-20  through 
NONWHITE%60-70  are all significant  at the 95  percent confidence level, 
although they are declining in absolute value.  This implies that the 
probability of sale by a white decreases with the white racial composition  of 
the neighborhood. (NONWHITE%80-90  is the omitted category.)  This is as 
expected,  since the population of potential white sellers also declines. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmA more useful interpretation of these results is illustrated in 
figure 3.  For a street that is 85 percent white, the probability of sale by a 
white is 92  percent.  For streets that are 55 percent and 25 percent white, 
the respective probabilities of sale by a white are 80  percent and 65 percent. 
These results reflect two possible influences.  First,  white homeowners within 
Lomond are potentially more mobile than black homeowners and are thus more 
likely to sell.  (Conventional wisdom at the Shaker Heights Housing Office 
states that whites in Lomond tend to be either young families purchasing their 
first homes,  upwardly mobile professionals, or transferees.)  Second,  the high 
probability of white sales relative to racial composition suggests white 
flight. 
I assume that the white propensity to sell is unaffected by the FFSH 
and contrast the results from Model 1 with the probability of white purchases. 
(Relaxing this assumption is an area for future research,  which should perhaps 
include joint estimation of the probabilities of white sales and buys.) 
Model 2 estimates the probability that a  white will purchase a 
house in Lomond.  As in Model 1,  a trend variable is included.  However,  Model 
2 also incorporates a shift variable, LOANYR, that increases by one for each 
year following the initiation of the FFSH loan program.  (LOANYR=l in 1986, 
...., LOANYR-4 in 1989.)  As with Model 1,  the coefficients on NONWHITE%lO-20 
through NONWHITE%60-70  are statistically significant and decline in absolute 
value. As shown in figure 4,  the probability of a buy by a white decreases as 
the nonwhite racial composition  of the street increases.  In  1985,  the year 
immediately preceding establishment of the FFSH, the probability of a white 
buying a house on an 85-percent-white  street was 64  percent, while the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmprobability of a white buying a house on a 25-percent-white  street was only 18 
percent. 
The probability of whites buying in Lomond steadily decreased between 
1980 and 1986.  The coefficient for MMONDYR is -0.1693  and is significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level,  This downward trend reversed in 1986, 
coinciding with the initiation of the FFSH.  The estimated coefficient on 
LOANYR is 0.4080 with a standard error of 0.1624 and is significant at the 95 
percent confidence level. 
To further explore the effect of the FFSH,  I interact LOANYR with 
three variables measuring the degree of nonwhite composition.  Model 3 
includes HIGHNW-1 for streets with a 70-100  percent nonwhite composition, 
MODNW-1 for streets with a 30-70  percent nonwhite composition,  and LOWNW-1  for 
streets with a 0-30  percent nonwhite composition.  Results suggest that the 
FFSH has a significant effect (at the 95 percent confidence level) on white 
purchases on streets that are 30-70  percent nonwhite.  The results for HIGHNW 
and LOWNW are positive,  but significant only at the 90  percent and 80  percent 
confidence levels, respectively.  (Relatively few transactions were observed 
in these areas.  ) 
To interpret these results, I again return to figure 3.  Prior to the 
initiation of the FFSH, the probability of a white buy was lower than the 
probability of a white sell for all levels of nonwhite street composition. The 
vertical distance between the two functions can  be interpreted as a measure of 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe pace of racial change.17  For streets that are 25 percent nonwhite, 
whites comprised 82  percent of the sales but only 58 percent of the buys, 
suggesting that a net 24 percent of the transactions involved a change of 
ownership from white to black.  For streets that are 75 percent nonwhite, the 
white sale-to-buy  ratio was 65 to 18,  suggesting that 47  percent of the sales 
involved a racial change. 
Figure 4  illustrates the effect of the FFSH on white buys as 
estimated in Model 3.  Upon initiation of the loan program in 1986,  the 
probability of white buys shifted up,  but still remained below the probability 
of white sells.  For a street with 55 percent nonwhites, the probability 
shifted from 42 to 51 percent.  By 1989,  the probability of white buys 
exceeded the probability of white sells for streets with nonwhite composition 
of 30  percent or less.  For a street with 55 percent nonwhites, the 
probability of a white buy rose to 75 percent, a 33-percentage-point  increase 
from pre-FFSH  levels.  For streets with a high number of nonwhite residents, 
however,  the probability of white buys remained low. 
An alternative measure of the loan program's  impact enters the 
dollar amount for which a house is eligible into the specification (rather 
than a shift variable that followed the initiation of the program) and yields 
qualitatively similar results.  The statistical fit,  however, is not as good 
as the results reported here.  This is consistent with the findings reported 
17  This assumes that the two functions are independent, an area for future 
research. 
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expectations of racial composition dominates the financial impact of the 
subsidies. 
In short,  these estimates suggest that the FFSH had a significant 
positive impact on the probability of  white purchases in Lomond.  Racial 
composition was stabilized in areas with 0-30  percent nonwhites, and white 
demand was significantly increased in areas with 30-70  percent nonwhites.  The 
estimated impact on  high-minority  areas (more than 70 percent nonwhite) was 
positive but smaller. 
5.  Effect of the FFSH on House Prices 
Following previous studies on race and housing, I estimate a simple 
hedonic price equation that explains transaction prices as a function of house 
quality,  neighborhood racial composition, and neighborhood fixed effects.  The 
basic form of the regression is shown in equation (2). 
where i - 1,  ....,  26,166  transactions and t - 83-89.  18 
18  Note that OTHSHAKER83 and COUNTY83 are set equal to zero to avoid perfect 
colinearity. 
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1989 in the eastside communities selected for the study.  l9  NONWHITE% is the 
racial composition reported in the census tract.  QUALITY is the vector of 
house-quality  measures.  FIXED is a vector of census-tract  dummy variables. 
LOMOND,  COUNTY, and OTHSHAKER are annual dummy variables that measure 
appreciation in Lomond,  other communities,  and other Shaker Heights areas, 
respectively. 
I enter measures of loan eligibility into the specification in order 
to ascertain whether the market intervention systematically changed 
transaction prices.  These measures include LOAN,  which equals the amount of 
loan for which the house is eligible, LOMONDYR,  which measures the trend in 
Lomond house prices beginning in 1983,  and LOANYR,  which measures any shift in 
appreciation  coinciding with the initiation of the loan program in 1986. 
Median prices in Lomond remained flat between 1982 and 1985,  while the 
rest of the eastside communities experienced an average appreciation rate of 
10  percent.  Prices in Lomond jumped 7 percent in 1986 upon initiation of the 
loan program,  however,  and had caught up with those of the other communities 
by 1988. 
To control for the impact of the loan program on housing prices more 
systematically,  I estimate equation (2) controlling for racial composition, 
house quality,  and neighborhood fixed effects.  I first estimate the model 
excluding variables related to the loan program.  Results are shown in 
19  The communities chosen were the City of Cleveland neighborhoods 
contiguous to the eastern suburbs,  and all of the suburbs extending eastward 
to Interstate 271,  the circumferential  highway. 
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Model 4  excludes the racial composition variables but includes the 
quality variables and neighborhood fixed effects.  Parameter estimates for the 
quality variables are contained in appendix A.~'  The quality variables in 
general have parameter estimates of the expected sign and of reasonable 
magnitude.  AGE has a negative and significant effect on prices.  LIVING AREA 
and LOT SIZE have positive and significant effects.  FULL BATHS and HALF BATHS 
do not have significant effects,  but PLUMBING FIXTURES does.  FIREPLACES,  AIR 
CONDITIONING,  HARDWOOD FLOORS, and SWIMMING POOL have the expected positive 
signs and are statistically significant.  The CONSTRUCTION GRADE and CONDITION 
variables are all statistically significant and are ranked in the expected 
order. 
The appreciation in Lomond house prices that began in 1986 and 
that is seen in the simple statistics appears in the LOMONDt dummy variables 
as well.  (The omitted neighborhood dummy variable is the Shaker Heights 
census tract immediately north of Lomond, in 1983.)  Prices,  which were 11 
percent below the control neighborhood in 1983,  climbed 19 percent between 
1985 and 1989.  Significant appreciation also occurred in the rest of the city 
over the same period,  however.  Because the market in northern Shaker Heights 
is substantially different in terms of price level and house characteristics, 
appreciation rates in LOMOND and OTHSHAKER may not be comparable.  Although 
20  Parameter estimates for the fixed neighborhood effects are not reported 
but are available upon request. 
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an alternative interpretation is that excess demand for OTHSHAKER houses 
pulled up the Lomond prices. 
Model 5 adds variables on racial composition.  NONWHITES is the racial 
composition for houses outside of Lomond (and equals zero within Lomond). 
NONWHITES LOMOND is the racial composition measured at the street level for 
houses within Lomond (and equals zero outside of Lomond).  The parameter 
estimates for the two variables are statistically significant and remarkably 
similar,  at -0.1574  and -0.1697  for NONWHITES and NONWHITE% LOMOND, 
respectively,  with t-statistics  of 2.65 and 2.16.  This suggests that a 10- 
percentage-point  shift in racial composition toward nonwhite reduces prices 
1.6 percent  .outside  of Lomond and 1.7 percent within Lomond.  To the extent 
that the FFHS stabilized racial composition,  the program seems to have had a 
significant direct effect on  housing prices. 
Model 6 omits the neighborhood fixed effects (but includes the quality 
variables).  The estimated coefficient on NONWHITE% doubles to -0.3372  from 
results seen in Model 4,  confirming Chamber's evidence that unobserved 
neighborhood effects significantly influence the white/nonwhite differential. 
The estimated impact of the loan program is reported in table 6.  2  1 
Note that the specifications include a trend variable (LOMONDYR) rather than 
21  Except as noted, estimated quality and year effects for Models 7 through 
11 change little from those reported in table 4  and are available from the 
author. 
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to this trend allows for the effect of the FFSH to be estimated from variation 
in the loan amounts over time and across streets within Lomond. 
Model 7 includes the variable MAN,  which equals the amount of loan 
for which the house is eligible (in thousands of dollars).  The estimated 
coefficient is 0.0213 with a t-statistic  of 1.48 and is not significant at 
conventional levels.  Model 8 interacts loan amounts with dummy variables for 
high,  moderate, and low nonwhite racial composition.  The coefficient for 
LOAN*MODNW is 0.0214  with a t-statistic  of 1.63,  suggesting that the loan 
program has a stronger impact in integrated areas.  This result can  be 
interpreted to mean that $1,000  of loan eligibility raises the sale price by 
2.14 percent.  With a median house price of $73,000  in 1986,  a $3,000  loan 
thus raised prices by $4,687,  suggesting that the loan program has large 
(perhaps implausible) spillover effects.  However, the t-statistic  of the 
coefficient falls just below the 90  percent confidence critical  value of 
1.645. We now turn to sorting out the fixed effect of the program from the 
impact of the loan value. 
Model 9 includes MANYR to measure any shift in appreciation 
coinciding with initiation of the FFSH.  The estimated coefficient is 0.0372 
with a t-statistic  of 1.27,  suggesting no significant overall shift. 
Interacting  MANYR  with the racial composition dummies in Model 10,  however, 
reveals that the initiation of the FFSH had a significant impact on  house 
price appreciation in the moderately nonwhite areas,  where prices rose 5.8 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpercent above trend.  The coefficient for LOANYR*MODNW  is 0.0582  with a 
t-statistic  of 2.25.  This result is consistent with the significant increase 
in the probability of white purchases in the same areas noted in section 4. 
Finally, I  distinguish the fixed effect of the FFSH on 
appreciation from the financial effect of the loan amounts.  To do this, I 
enter both the LOAN* and the LOANYR* variables in Model 11.  The coefficients 
for LOAN* are all insignificant.  The coefficient for LOANYR*MODNW, however, 
is 0.0471 with a t-statistic  of 1.59.  Although this figure is just below the 
90  percent critical value, I  interpret these results to mean that the fixed 
effect of the FFSH had a significant impact on house price appreciation that 
dominated the financial effect of the loan amounts.  The program was effective 
on integrated streets with a nonwhite composition  between 30 and 70  percent, 
but no significant impact was seen in low- (0-30  percent) or high- (70-100 
percent) minority areas. 
6  . Conclusion 
This paper estimates the impact of race-based  housing subsidies 
on racial composition and housing prices within the Lomond area of Shaker 
Heights.  Before the FFSH was established in May 1986,  Lomond was undergoing 
significant racial change.  Results of this study suggest that the loan 
program has had a stabilizing effect on the neighborhood's racial composition, 
particularly on streets with fewer than 70% nonwhite residents. 
Prior to May 1986,  housing prices in Lomond had lagged those of 
surrounding communities.  Upon initiation of the FFSH,  however,  prices 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmincreased significantly in areas with a 30-70  percent nonwhite population. 
The results further suggest that the direct fixed effect of initiating the 
program dominated any financial effect of capitalizing loans of relatively 
small present value.  In sum,  prointegrative subsidies in integrated 
neighborhoods can directly affect racial composition and appear to have 
important spillover effects (potentially related to expectations of future 
racial composition) that raise housing prices. 
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(4)  (5  (6) 
AGE OF HOUSE -  LOG 
LOG LIVING AREA SQF 
LOG FRONTAGE LOT 
LOG LOT SIZE 
GARAGE CAPACITY 
GARAGE SIZE SQF (1000'S) 
NUMBER OF ROOMS 
NUMBER OF BEDROOMS 
NUMBER OF FULL BATHS 
NUMBER OF HALF BATHS 
PLUMBING FIXTURES 
FIREPLACES 
BSMNT SIZE SQF (1000'S) 
FNSHD BSMNT SQF (1000'S) 
NUMBER OF PORCHES 
TERRACED DECK SQF (1000'S) 
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EXT/HEAW  TRAFFIC 
SIDEWALK 
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CONSTR.  GRADE AA 
CONSTR.  GRADE A+ 
CONSTR.  GRADE A 
CONSTR.  GRADE B+ 
CONSTR.  GRADE B 
CONSTR.  GRADE C 
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(4)  (5)  (6) 
EXT. WALLS ALUMINUM 
EXT  . WALLS BRICK 
EXT. WALLS FRAME/BRICK 
EXT. WALLS STUCCO 
EXT. WALLS BRICK/STUCCO 
EXT. WALLS COMPOSITE/SIDING 
EXT. WALLS ASBESTOS/SIDING 
EXT  . WALLS STONE 
EXT. WALLS CONCRETE BLOCK 
HIP ROOF STYLE 
GAMBREL ROOF STYLE 
MANSARD ROOF STYLE 
FLAT ROOF STYLE 
SLATE  ROOF 
TILE ROOF 
WOOD SHAKE ROOF 
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COMPOSITION ROOF 
METAL ROOF 
HARDWOOD 1ST FLOOR 
HARDWOOD 2ND FLOOR 
PANELING 1ST FLOOR 





SLAB CONSTRUCTION/NO BSMNT 
CRAWL SPACE/NO BSMNT 
ATTACHED GARAGE 
SWIMMING POOL 
a.  Estimated coefficients (standard errors). 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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Median  House  Prices  ($),  1976-89 
Eastern 
Cuyahoga  Other 
Year  County  Shaker  Lomond 
Source: Cuyahoga  County  Recorder's Office. 
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Racial  Composition of Lomond  Sales 
Year 
Total 
Percent of  Sales 
To  Whites  To  Blacks 
Source:  Shaker  Heights Housing  Office. 
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Independent Variables, Quality Measures 
Variable 
AGE OF HOME 
LIVING AREA SQF 
FRONT FOOTAGE FT 
LOT SIZE SQF 
NUMBER OF ROOMS 
NUMBER OF BEDROOMS 
NUMBER OF BATHROOMS 
NUMBER OF HALF BATHS 
PLUMBING FIXTURES 
GARAGE CAPACITY 
GARAGE SIZE SQF 
NUMBER OF PORCHES 
TERRACED DECK SQF 
OPEN PORCH SQF 
ENCLOSED PORCH SQF 
BASEMENT SIZE SQF 
FINISHED BASEMENT SQF 




















CONSTRUCTION GRADE AA 
CONSTRUCTION GRADE A+ 
CONSTRUCTION GRADE A 
CONSTRUCTION GRADE B+ 
CONSTRUCTION GRADE B 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
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Variable  -  suma  Mean  Std. Dev. 
CONSTRUCTION GRADE C  4,916 
CONSTRUCTION GRADE D  127 
CONDITION BAD  1,388 
CONDITION FAIR  2,721 
CONDITION GOOD  6,948 
CONDITION EXCELLENT  664 
EXT. WALLS ALUMINUM  7,360 
EXT. WALLS BRICK  6,007 
EXT. WALLS FRAME/BRICK  691 
EXT. WALLS STUCCO  162 
EXT. WALLS BRICK/STUCCO  125 
EXT. WALLS COMPOSITE/SIDING  31 
EXT. WALLS ASBESTOS/SIDING  424 
EXT. WALLS STONE  38 
EXT. WALLS CONCRETE BLOCK  13 
HIP ROOF STYLE  2,648 
GAMBREL ROOF STYLE  281 
MANSARD ROOF STYLE  46 
FLAT ROOF STYLE  6  3 
SLATE ROOF  2,828 
TILE ROOF  396 
WOOD SHAKE ROOF  545 
COMPOSITE ROOF  8  7 
METAL ROOF  5 
HARDWOOD 1ST FLOOR  24,553 
HARDWOOD 2ND FLOOR  15,225 
PANELING 1ST FLOOR  34 
PANELING 2ND FLOOR  389 
FINISHED ATTIC  7,796 
STEAM HEAT  2,949 
HEAT PUMP  117 
AIRCONDITION  4,490 
SLAB CONSTRUCTION/NO BASEMENT  1,187 
CRAWL SPACE/NO BASEMENT  280 
ATTACHED GARAGE  7,898 
SWIMMING POOL  174 
a. Reported for 0/1  dummy variables.  Total number of observations equals 
26,166. Omitted characteristics include NORMAL VIEW, REGULAR LOT,  NORMAL 
TRAFFIC,  COLONIAL STYLE,  CONSTRUCTION GRADE C+, CONDITION NORMAL, EXT. WALLS 
FRAME,  PITCH ROOF STYLE,  AND ASPHALT SHINGLE ROOF. 
Source: Cuyahoga County property tax records. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4 
Logit Model Estimates: Probability of White Buyer/Seller  in ~omond~ 
Dependent Var.-1  Dependent Var.=l 
if Sold bv White  if Bought bv White 
LOANYR*HIGHNW  ...  ...  0.4524 
(70-100%  nonwhite)  ...  ...  (0.2696) 
LOANYR*MODNW  ...  ...  0.3578 
(30  -70%  nonwhite)  ...  ...  (0.1597) 
LOANYR*LOWNW  ...  ...  0.7029 
(0-30%  nonwhite)  ...  ...  (0.4771) 
LOMONDYR  -0.0157  -0.1693  -0.1587 
(1980-0,  ...,  1989=9)  (0.0500)  (0.0835)  (0.0799) 
INTERCEPT 
No. of Observations  317  317  317 
No. of Dependent Var.-1  242  17  8  178 
No. of Dependent Var.=O  7  5  139  139 
Model Chi-squared  19.87  39.76  37.51 
a. Estimated coefficients (standard errors). 
Note: NONWHITE%80-90  is the omitted category.  MANYR  is the age of the loan 
program and equals 0  before 1986,  equals 1 in 1986,  ..., equals 4  in 1989. 
HIGHNW-1 if street is 70-100%  nonwhite.  MODNW-1 if street is 30-70%  nonwhite. 
LOW1  if street is 0-30%  nonwhite. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5 
Hedonic House Price Regression: Controlling for 
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Hedonic House Price Regression: Controlling for 






No.  of Observations 
Mean Dependent Var. 
S.S  .E. 
S.E.R. 
R-  squared 
a. Estimated coefficients (standard errors). 
Note: Parameter estimates for quality measures are reported in appendix A. 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6 
Hedonic Price Regression: Controlling For 
Impact of Loan programa 
LOMONDYR  0.0222  0.0233  0.0124  0.0008  -0.0022 
(1983-0,  ....  1989-6)  (0.0140)  (0.0142) (0.0229) (0.0202) (0.0208) 
LOAN ($1,000) 
LOAN*HIGHNW 
(70-100%  nonwhite) 
LOAN*MODNW 
(30-70%  nonwhite) 
LOAN*LOWNW 
(0-30%  nonwhite) 
LOANYR 
LOANYR*HIGHNW 
(0-30%  nonwhite) 
LOANYR*MODNW 
(30-  70% nonwhite) 
LOANYR*LOWNW 
(70-100%  nonwhite) 
Observations  26,166  26,166  26,166  26,166  26,166 
Mean Dependent Var.  11.0110  11.0110  11.0110  11.0110  11.0110 
R-  squared  0.8277  0.8277  0.8277  0.8277  0.8277 
S.E.R  0.2410  0.2410  0.2410  0.2410  0.2410 
a.  Estimated coefficients (standard errors). 
Note: LOAN - $1,000  of loan eligibility.  LOANYR is the age of the loan 
....  program and equals 0  before 1986,  equals 1 in  1986,  equals 4  in 1989. 
HIGHNW-1 if street is 70-100%  nonwhite. MODNW=l if street is 30-70%  nonwhite. 
LOWNW-1 if street is 0-30%  nonwhite. Parameter estimates for quality measures 
and appreciation in COUNTY and OTHSHAKER are contained in an appendix 
available from the author. 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
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CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
*Courtland 
oval 
Boulevard Elementary  K-4 
Fernway Elementary  K-4 
Lomond Elementary  K-4 
Mercer Elementary  K-4 
Onaway Elementary  K-4 
Woodbury Elementary  5-6 
Shaker Heights Mlddle School  7-8 
Shaker Heights High School  9-12 
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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 2 
AVAILABILITY OF LOANS IN LOMOND: LOCATION AND AMOUNT 
LOMOND NEIGHBORHOOD 
Mav 1. 1986 -  December 31. 1986 
Loan value was $3,000  for the 
entire Lomond neighborhood. 
January 1. 1987 -  March 31. 1989 
Loan  value remained at $3,000  for 
purchases east of Palmerston  Road 
Loan  value increased to $4,000  for 
purchases on Palmerston  Road and 
west (shaded region)  . 
April 1. 1989 -  Present 
Loan value remained at $3,000  for all 
purchases east of Normandy Road 
(boundary  moved from Palmerston  Road 
to Normandy Road) . 
Loan  value increased to $5,000  for 




Buy (Sell)  1 
by a  White 
White ~uys/Sales  in Lomond: 
(No  Loan Pmgmm) 
0 
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% Nonwhite on Street 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 4 
Probability of 
Buy  (Sell)  I 
by a  White 
White Buys/Sales  in Lomond: 
Loan Program Effect 
% Nonwhite on Street 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
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